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THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSUMER COOPERATIVES
IN THE GHETTO
The principles of the modern-day cooperative can be traced to those first
adopted by the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers:' economic power
through collective, democratic effort, with emphasis on equality of control,
political neutrality, and a non-discriminatory membership policy.2 These
principles were followed at an early date in this country by farmers' marketing and purchasing cooperatives. More recently they have been utilized by
groups of consumers seeking to maximize purchasing power. 4
In 1968 approximately 500,000 American families were owners or members
of some 430 consumer cooperatives.3 Total assets that year approached $200
million and gross sales were approximately $450 million. 6 Thus far, consumer cooperative enterprise has been largely a middle-class phenomenon 7 and
the establishment of these associations in ghetto areas is only a relatively
recent development.8 From an economic standpoint, however, the cooperative method of distribution is particularly suitable for urban low-income
areas. 9 Therefore, it is likely that the utilization of consumer cooperatives by
ghetto residents will increase substantially during the next few years.' 0
The thrust of many current congressional" and administrative 2 urban

1. E. Roy,

COOPERATIVES: TODAY AND ToMoRRow 53-55 (1964).
L. KmtcnER, V. KEBKER, & W. LELAND, JR., CONSUMER COOPERATIVES N TIm NORTH
CERAL STATES 4-7 (1951) [hereinafter cited as KERcHER]. ,
3. The peculiar status of farmer cooperatives has been recognized and protected by
farmer's cooperative statutes in all states. E. Roy, CooPERATVES: TODAY AND ToMouow 255

2.

(1964).
4.

For an interesting discussion of the application of cooperative principles to the

consumer and others, see Miller, Increasing Low-Income Consumer Buying and Borrowing
Power by Cooperative Action, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 709 (1968); Satterfield, The Cooperative in
Our Free Enterprise System, 33 Miss. L.J. 14 (1961). See also 12 U.S.C. §1752 (1964),
which permits the organization of federal credit unions "for the purpose of promoting thrift
among its members and creating a source of credit for provident or productive purposes"
on a cooperative basis. Another widespread use of cooperative principles has been by groups
of small retail merchants seeking to compete in purchasing power with chain stores. By
1964 retail food store cooperatives accounted for 44% of all grocery sales. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FOOD MARKETING, FOOD FROM FARMER TO CONSUMER 70 (1966).
5. Danforth, Needed: Strong Multi-Unit Co-ops, Co-op REPORT, Aug.-Sept. 1969, at
30-31.

6. Id. at 30.
7. Id.
8. Silverstein, Cooperative Retail Business-A Route to Self-Help, Pride and Profit
in Economically Blighted Communities, 23 TAx LAw. 315 (1970).
9. Id. at 315.
10. Id. at 315-17.
11. See, e.g., Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C.

§§2701,

2902, 2906(b)

(1964).

See also Baum, The Federal Trade Commission and the War on Poverty, 14 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 1071 (1967).
12. 34 Fed. Reg. §6703

(Supp. 1969); see Vazquez, The Role of the Department of

Commerce in the Development of Minority Business Enterprise, 25 Bus. LAw. 55 (Special
Issue 1969).
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redevelopment -programs, as well as those initiated by business and industry 8
and by private foundations,' 4 has been toward injecting credit and investment capital into the inner cities. The long-range goal of these programs is to
create a sound economic base that will support viable, competitive economic
entities in the blighted urban areas.1Yet the climate for establishing retail businesses in urban core areas is less
than inviting. Although the urban poor are in desperate need of quality goods
and services at competitive prices, 16 ghetto consumers do not represent a
suitable market for most retail businesses.'. This problem is compounded by
a lack of adequate support facilities, such as store space, lighting, parking,
and sewers, and by the unavailability of adequate insurance protection. s
Consumer cooperatives are better able to survive the adverse ghetto economic conditions than are traditional retail businesses.' 9 Moreover, the cooperative form of distribution is uniquely suited to provide ghetto consumers
with quality goods at competitive prices.2 0 In emphasizing economic power
through collective, democratic effort, the consumer cooperative provides a
icalistic model for urban economic redevelopment as well as the nucleus
for creative social development.
The purpose of the present note is to inform the practicing attorney and
potential cooperative organizer of some of the legal problems and implications encountered in organizing consumers' purchasing cooperatives in underdeveloped urban areas. Particular emphasis is placed upon the practical
aspects of financing, selection of the proper business entity, and federal in13. Clark, The Crisis: Attitudes and Behavior, in BusINxss L.ADERSHIP AND THE NEGRO
CIusIs 21, 31-32 (E. Ginsberg ed. 1968).
14. Atterbury, Experiments in Making Foundation Credit Available to the Poor, 25
Bus. LAw. 21 (Special Issue 1969).
15. See, e.g., Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §2701 (1964) (declaration of purpose).
16. D. CAPLovrrz, THE PooR PAY MORE 18-20 (1967) [hereinafter cited as D. CAPLovrrz].
17. Purchasing power of ghetto consumers is limited not only because of low incomes
but also because of unsophisticated buying habits, id. at 14. In order to cater to installment
buying habits, ghetto retailers must often double or triple the total price of goods in
order to realize the same profit margin as their non-ghetto counterparts. FEDERA.L TRADE
CoMMIssIoN, THE ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT

CREDIT AND RErAiL SALES PRACICEs

(1968), cited in White, Consumer Credit in the Ghetto: UCCC
Entry Provisionsand the Federal Trade Commission Study, 25 Bus. LAw. 143, 146 (Special
Issue 1969). This increase in the purchase price of goods sold to low-income consumers is
necessitated by the fact that merchants often must go to considerable expense in order to
recover the debt or may have to write the purchase off as uncollectible. The extent of increase generally will depend on the percentage of "high risk" clientele ordinarily buying
from the merchant and the particular profit margin the merchant has determined to recover.
See generally D. CAPLoVrrz, supra note 16, ch. 2.
18. See Griffin, Office of Economic Opportunity Programs, 25 Bus. LAw. 43, 45 (Special
IN THE DIssRcr OF COLUMBIA

Issue 1969).

19. The cooperative is eminently more flexible than traditional modes of enterprise
and can be organized with a minimum of capital. See text accompanying notes 33-36
infra.
20. Consumer cooperatives provide three sources for consumer savings: elimination of
net profits, reduction of operating costs, and reduction or elimination of the federal income tax. See text accompanying notes 31-36 infra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss4/3

2

Black and Coleman:
The Organization of Consumer Cooperatives in the Ghetto
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. XXIII

come tax implications since these problems are likely to be most often presented to organizers and counsel. The scope of this discussion will be that
of a general overview rather than a detailed analysis of any one particular
problem area.
ECONOMIc ADVANTAGES

OF

CooPERATIvE DISTuBUTION

In retail accounting practice, there are three components that make
up the selling price of an item: cost of goods sold, operational costs (sales,
real estate and rent costs, utilities, insurance and taxes); and net margin
(net profit).21 Therefore, in order to lower selling prices a retailer must
purchase goods for less, lower his operational costs, or realize less net profit. It is unlikely that an independent ghetto retailer will be able to purchase goods at lower than market wholesale prices. On the contrary, a
newly formed retail business will probably pay more for its goods than
its competitors because initial purchasing volume will not be sufficient
to realize quantity discounts. 22 Operational costs are generally fixed in
character and provide little latitude for the realization of savings. 23 Finally, nationwide surveys indicate that net margins of retail businesses are
characteristically small 24 and it is, consequently, unlikely that consumer
savings can be realized through reducing profit margins.
Another factor renders the traditional retail business unsatisfactory
as a functional mode for reduction of low-income consumer costs. Buying
habits of low-income consumers are characterized by a very low level of
sophistication in the pricing of items. 25 In addition, these habits are generally oriented toward installment purchases, which often result in net
retail markups of as much as 300 per cent of original suggested cash
prices. 26 Therefore, even if it were possible for an independent ghetto retailer to reduce prices on a cash basis, because of inability to buy on a
cash basis or a predisposition to installment purchasing, ghetto consumers
probably would not patronize the business. It is apparent that in order to
provide a suitable market for the support of local businesses, ghetto consumers not only must be provided with goods at lower costs, they also
21. L. Wmss, CASE STUDIS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 214, 215 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
L. WEIsS].

22. For example, it has been estimated that the "optimal" annual sales volume for a
supermarket is about $Imillion per year. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FOOD MARKETING, FOOD
FROM FARMER To CONSUMER 72 (1966), cited in L. WEmss, supra note 21, at 213.
23. L. WEIss, supra note 21, at 214-15.
24. For example, the following average retail net margins have been estimated: 1.6%
for supermarkets, 2.5% for department stores, 12% for variety stores, 1.1% for service stations,
and 5.2% for drug stores. L. Wmss, supra note 21, at 219.
25. D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 16, at 19, in which the author states: "These merchants
have a 'captive' market because their customers do not meet the economic requirements
of consumers in the larger, bureaucratic marketplace. But also, they can sell inferior
goods at high prices because, in their own words, the customers are not 'price and
quality conscious.'"
26. D. CAM'vrrz, supra note 16, at 16. The author notes that merchants bypass maxi.
mum credit charges by not marking their merchandise and use a numbering system to
indicate whether the item was sold at 100, 200, or 300% of its hypothetical wholesale price.
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must be educated in pricing and buying techniques so as to maximize
their limited purchasing power.
It has been suggested that the lack of sophistication in buying habits
stems from the inability of the urban poor to fully understand or influence
the day-to-day economic decisions that affect their lives. 27 This sense of
futility is intensified by the fact that urban dwellers generally lack organized, effective means through which they can channel their interest and
combat prevailing economic conditions. 28 Consequently, the creation of a
sound economic base in the ghetto will, to a great degree, be dependent
upon the extent ghetto residents become participants in local enterprises.
Stimulation and continuous maintenance of stable commercial activity requires that dollars locally spent inure to the benefit of local ghetto residents29 and that the frustrations of residents be satisfied by allowing them
an effective role in their society. Without substantial control and participation in the ghetto economy it is unlikely that the urban poor will actively
support local enterprise. 30
When compared with traditional forms of retail enterprise, the cooperative system of distribution offers several distinct advantages to the ghetto
consumer and to the urban economy as a whole. Through use of the cooperative form, substantial savings can be achieved that can be allocated to meet
future capital needs or distributed to member-consumers, 3 or both.
A small, but significant, source of savings occurs through elimination
of the net margin.3 2 Savings can also be realized through reduced costs of
operation. For example, in the early stages of development, members may
help to offset labor costs (which account for approximately one-half of all
operating expenses).3 3 In addition, capital improvement can be financed

27. D. CAPLovriz, supra note 16, at 14. In reference to the low income consumer, the
author states: "They tend to lack the information and training needed to be effective
consumers in a bureaucratic society. Partly because of their limited education and partly
because as migrants from more traditional societies they are unfamiliar with urban culture,
they are not apt to follow the announcements of sales in newspapers, to engage in comparative shopping, to know their way around the major department stores and bargain

centers, to know how to evaluate the advice of salesmen -practices necessary for some degree
of sophistication in the realm of consumption." Id.
28. T. Caoss, BLAcK CAprrALIM 90 (1969).
29. See Weston, Economic Development of Corporations,25 Bus. LAw. 219, 224 (Special
Issue 1969).
30. DeLorean, The Problem, in BLAcK EcoNoMIc DEVELoPMENT 7, 14 (W. Haddad & G.
Pugh eds. 1969): "If black people don't own and control it [ghetto enterprise] the most
important factor is lost. There are some gains but not the ones we need most of all at
this time-to make our own: decisions and control our own lives!" See also Shadden, A
Model Consumer Action Program for Low Income Neighborhoods, 1-4 (Department of
Church Planning, Church Federation of Greater Chicago, May 1966); Eichelbaum, Economic
Development in Poverty Areas, 75 CAM & CoM., March-April 1970, at 3.

31. See text accompanying notes 164-167 infra.
32. Kacmm, supra note 2, at 8.
35. L. Wmss, supra note 21, at 214.
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through savings on a gradual basis34 since consumers will probably be willing to accept lower standards in physical appearance and space than they
would from independent retailers with whom they would otherwise do business. Moreover, the capital investment necessary to reach "optimal volume"
(the volume at which cost of goods sold is reduced to a competitive level) 35
is likely to be less in cooperatives than in similar retail establishments. Favorable tax treatment also gives the cooperative an additional advantage over
similar retail businesses and provides another source of savings for the consumer members.30
The ghetto-based consumer cooperatives may provide a significant service
to consumer-members by teaching them the advantages of cash purchasing
and the pitfalls of installment purchasing. 37 In addition, since control of the
cooperative is apportioned equally on a one-man one-vote basis, 38 the cooperative can uniquely provide its member-consumers with the opportunity to
participate in the decisions that govern the operation of the business. Such
participation may extend to decisions concerning the prices charged for items,
as well as their quantity and quality. The locally owned and operated cooperative may also provide a valuable source of jobs, and the opportunity for
some community members to learn new skills. 39 The participatory role of
residents not only aids the individuals, but identification of members and
patrons with the business entity through which they obtain their goods and
services fosters the continued patronage essential to the survival of any business enterprise.
FINANCING

PreorganizationActivities
The initial step in organizing a consumer cooperative usually involves
the procurement of financial commitments from prospective members or
shareholders. The preincorporation subscription agreement may be called a
"share" in the case of a stock cooperative or a "membership agreement" in
the case of a nonstock cooperative. 40 It may embody provisions for the purchase of a facility or entire enterprise, for employment contracts, for eventual limited return on part or all of the capital, for a very limited interest return, or for the eventual payment of patronage refunds. 41 If the agreements
34. Silverstein, supra note 8, at 318.
35. L. WaIss, supra note 21, at 214. See Walker, The Role of the Attorney in a Community Owned and Operated Cooperative, 25 Bus. LAw. 195 (Special Issue 1969).

36. See text accompanying notes 253-261 infra.
87. Miller, Organizing the Consumer Cooperative, in Tm LAW AND Ta
CONSUMER 393-94 (C. Katz ed. 1968).
38.

Low INCou

KRacHE , supra note 2, at 4-7.

39. Walker, The Role of the Attorney in a Community Owned and Operated Cooperative, 25 Bus. LAw. 195, 197 (Special Issue 1969).
40. I. PACKEL, THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION or CooPERATrm
after cited as PAKEL].

41. Id. at 49-50.
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are properly drafted and approved by the cooperative, they will be binding
upon the members and enforceable at law. 4 2 Although subscription agreements do not bind the cooperative unless it assents to them, 43 the courts may
use a variety of theories to enforce the agreements against the cooperative.Even in the absence of paid-in-capital requirements, which may be imposed by particular statutes,45 it is of primary importance that organizers
and counsel assure the existence of adequate capital for day-to-day operation
of the business and for the repayment of debt obligations. Undercapitalization 46 and "thin" capitalization 47 have frequently been important factors in
cases denying corporate shareholders their defense of limited liability. However, one authority has suggested that traditional notions concerning equitydebt relationship 48 cannot be strictly applied to cooperatives since statutes
or bylaws often limit the return of capital to fixed rates of interest, and involving loan certificates often provide for no fixed rate of return.' 9
If equity capital is to be obtained from the sale of memberships or shares,
and if the size and scope of the prospective cooperative is sufficiently large,
counsel for the promoters or organizers should also carefully consider the
possible applicability of federal and state statutes regulating the sale and
distribution of securities.
Federal Security Laws
The Securities Act of 1933- was enacted to insure full, public disclosure
of all information that might be material to prospective investors and to pre42. See, e.g., Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Rogers,
N.E. 584 (1926); Warren County Cooperative Ass'n v. Boyd, 171 N.C.
43. See, e.g., Chapman v. Sky L'Onda Mut. Water Co., 69 Cal.
988 (1945); Zalewski v. Pennsylvania Rabbit Breeders Cooperative

88 Ind. App. 469, 150
184, 88 SYE. 153 (1916).
App. 2d 667, 159 P.2d
Ass'n, 76 Pa. D. & C.

225 (C.P. Adams County 1950).
44. Hart Potato Growers' Ass'n v. Greiner, 236 Mich. 638, 641, 211 N.W. 45, 46 (1926);
McCloskey v. Charleroi Mountain Club, 390 Pa. 212, 134 A2d 873 (1957). As in the case
of general business corporations, courts may utilize theories such as ratification, adoption,
continuing offer, or third party beneficiary to bind the cooperative. See, e.g., Hackbarth v.
Wilson Lumber Co., 56 Idaho 628, 212 P. 969 (1923) (continuing offer was called "the
most logical theory of liability to fit the case"); McArthur v. Times Printing Co., 48 Minn.
319, 51
45.
46.
2d 576,
47.

N.W. 216 (1892) (adoption).
Compare D.C. CoDE ANN. §29-804 (1968), with FLA. STAT. §608.03 (2) (d) (1969).
Anderson v. Abbot, 821 US. 349, 362 (1944). See also Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.
864 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
See, e.g., Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958). Contributors are often

given a substantial amount of debt as well as preferred stock and junior securities in
return for their capital in a deliberate attempt to avoid "double taxation" from payment
of dividends and to provide deductions for interest for the corporation. Tomlinson v. The
1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'g 247 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. Fla. 1965); Nassau
Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1962).
48. Normally, equity capital does not represent an indebtedness of a corporation to its
shareholders. See, e.g., Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 815 U.S.

583 (1941); Sternbergh v. Brock, 225 Pa. 279, 284, 74 A. 166, 168 (1909).
49.

PACKE.L, supra note 40, at 170-71.

50. 15 U.S.C. §§77a-bbb (1964).
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vent fraud in the sale of securities.1 The Act makes it unlawful for any person to use interstate facilities or the mails for the purpose of offering to sell
any security prior 'to filing a registration statement with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.5 2
The Act expressly exempts farmers' cooperative associations, as defined
in paragraphs (12), (13), and (14) of section 103 of the Revenue Act of
1932. 53 Presumably, this express exemption does not extend to other than
farmers' cooperatives. Therefore, any claim of nonapplicability of registration requirements to consumer cooperatives would have to be grounded upon
either a showing that the provisions of the Act do not contemplate consumer
cooperative shares or memberships within the definition of "securities,"' 5
or, alternatively, upon a showing that the particular cooperative issue in
question falls within the scope of one of the express exemptive provisions.
0
These include the "private offering"-5 exemption, the "intrastate offering6"
57
offerings.
small
to
relating
exemption
3
exemption, and 'the section
There are very few federal security cases in which the question of the security character of cooperative shares or membership agreements has been
in issue. In United States v. Davis58 it was held that certificates in a cooperative association that entitled the holders to a profit-sharing arrangement were
securities within the meaning of section 2 (1) of the Act. 59 Similarly, in
Tcherepnin v. Knight 0 the Supreme Court was faced with construing the
term "security" as used in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,61 in reference to withdrawable shares in a savings and loan association. The Court
noted that the provisions in the 1933 Act relating to the term "security" are
almost identical to those of the 1934 Act,6 2 and stated that both acts em63
body:
[A] flexible rather than static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits.
Viewing section 2 of the Act in the abstract, it is apparent that Congress intended the regulations to apply to a wide range of financial arrange51.

See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv.

29 (1959).
52. Securities Act of 1933, §5 (a), 15 U.S.C. §77e (a) (1964).
53. Securities Act of 1933, §3 (5), 15 U.S.C. §77c (a) (5) (1964).
54. Securities Act of 1933, §2 (1), 15 U.S.C. §77 (b) (1) (1964).
55. Securities Act of 1933, §4 (1), 15 U.S.C. §77d (2) (1964).
56. Securities Act of 1933, §3(a) (11), 15 U.S.C. §77c (a) (11) (1964).
57. Securities Act of 1933, §3 (b), 15 U.S.C. §77c (d) (1964).
58. 40 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
59. Securities Act of 1933, §2 (1), 15 U.S.C. §77 (b) (1) (1964).
60. 389 U.S. 332 (1967)
61. 15 U.S.C. §78c (a) (10) (1964).
62. 389 U.S. at 336.
63. Id. at 338. Since "profit-sharing," in the traditional sense, is the antithesis of
consumer cooperative operation and practice the precedent value of Davis and Tcherepnin
for determining the "security" nature of consumer and cooperative shares or mem.
bership is questionable.
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ments 14 In addition, the decisions construing this section have given a very
liberal interpretation to its provisions. 5 Therefore, it would probably be
most prudent for cooperative managers or organizers to assume that the Act
does encompass cooperative shares and attempt to ground non-applicability
of the registration regulations upon one of the express exemptive provisions.66
The Private Offering Exemption. The Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) has stated that the number of persons to whom an offering is extended is relevant only in determining whether the offerees have sufficient
knowledge of the offeror's operations and purpose of the issue in order for
them to make an informed investment decision.6r Another important factor
is whether the securities are purchased for investment or for resale. 68
The Intrastate Exemption. The Commission has stated that no part of
an issue can be offered or sold to a nonresident if the issue is to retain its
"intrastate" character. 69 This rule applies to all securities forming a part of
the issue, including those sold to residents of the state of issue. In other
words, if part of the issue is "interstate" in character, the intrastate exemption will not apply to any other part of the issue.70 Moreover, the proceeds of
64. Securities Act of 1933, §2(1), 15 U.S.C. §77(b)(1) (1964) provides in part: "The
term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral trust
."
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription ....
65. E.g., SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,

320 U.S. 344 (1943).
66. This might be more likely when the contracts between a cooperative and its
members are shares of business corporation stock than when they are membership certificates, as in the case of cooperatives incorporated under nonprofit or special purpose
statutes. See text accompanying notes 221-223 infra. These statutes generally make it clear

that members are not entitled to share in the profits of the corporation. See, e.g., D.C.
CODE ANN. §29-831 (4)(a)-(d) (1968); FLA. STAT. §617.011 (1969). However, members may
receive a prorata share based on patronage of those funds in excess of cost of goods and

expenses. See D.C.

CODE ANN.

§29-831 (1968). Whether these patronage refunds should be

treated as a share in the "profits" of the cooperative is a matter of much discussion among
cooperative experts. Compare Note, Non-Profit Corporations-Definition, 17 VAND. L. RyV.
336 (1963), with R. PATrERSON, THE TAx ExE PTION OF CooPEmATrvEs 13-15 (1961).

67. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). This interpretation was first
enunciated by the Supreme Court in dictum in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,

125 (1953).
68. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1952); cf. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957). Statements by the purchasers of securities to the effect that
the securities are purchased for investment and not for resale are not conclusive as to
intent; however, it would seem that restrictions placed upon the transferability of cooperative shares might be conclusive as limiting their purchase to purposes of "investment"
rather than "resale." Cf. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1952). For a discussion of the operation of the private offering exemption see Orrick, Non-Public Offerings
of Corporate Securities-Limitations on the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act,
21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1959).
69. SEC Securities Act Release No. 201 (July 30, 1934).
70. Id. See, e.g., Hillsborough Inv. Corp. v. SEC, 276 F.2d 665 (Ist Cir. 1960); SEC
v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830, 871 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 285 F.2d
162 (9th Cir. 1960).
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the offering must be used for business conducted primarily within the state
71
of issue.
Regulation A. Section 3 of the 1933 Act confers upon the Commission
the power to exempt certain securities that by reason of their small amount
and limited character do not require regulation in order to protect the public interest.7 2 Generally, if the securities constitute in the aggreggate less than
300,000 dollars, and if they are not within special classes excluded by the
Commission,7 3 they will be held exempt.7 4 The applicability of this exemption to a proposed cooperative issue could be easily determined in advance
of the offering. Nevertheless, it is important to consult the Commission well
in advance of any proposed issue in order to insure full compliance with appropriate rules and regulations.7 5
Blue Sky Laws

In addition to the federal security laws, it is important that organizers of
consumer cooperatives be cognizant of the possible applicability of state blue
sky laws. Most states provide for some form of regulation of the issue, sale,
and trading of securities.7 6 The Florida act 77 provides for registration by
notification, by qualification, and by announcement.78 Thus, it ranks among
the most extensive of state blue sky laws3 9 Most of the definitive Florida
provisions are identical to those of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and,
as in the federal act, these provisions are generally applicable to cooperatives unless a specific exemption is granted.-0
71. SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957); see SEC Securities Act Release No. 201 (July 30, 1934).
72. Securities Act of 1933, §3, 15 U.S.C. §77c (b). (1964). This the Commission has done
by promulgating Regulation A. SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. §230.252 (1970).
73. SEC Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§230.252 (b), (c), (d) (1970).
74. 17 C.F.R. §230.254 (1970). See generally Glavin & Purcell, Securities Offerings and
Regulation A -Requirements and Risks, 13 Bus. LAw. 303, 313-34 (1958).
75. The Commission will give informal interpretative advice concerning the applicability of exemptive provisions to specific offers. 17 C.F.R. §200.2 (1970). In certain cases it
will even state as a matter of public record that no action will be taken concerning a
proposed offer that it deems to be exempt from registration. 17 C.F.R. §200.81, as amended
by 35 Fed. Reg. 17779, 17780 (1970). Inquiries requesting a "no-action" letter should state
in an identifying caption the specific relevant provisions of the Securities Act. Id. Extreme
caution should be exercised in making any public statement concerning the proposed offering
until such time as the exempt status of the offering is positively determined. See SEC
Securities Act Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957).
76. See Draftsman's Commentary to Section 402 (a) of the Uniform Securities Act,
cited in L. Loss & E. Cowr, BLUE SKY LAw 352 (1958). For example, New York requires
the filing of certain rather basic information, N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §§352 et seq. (McKinney
1947), whereas California has created a complex and comprehensive scheme of regulation,
CAL. CoRP.ANN. CODE, § §25000 et seq. (West 1955).
77. FLA. STAT. ch.517 (1969).
78. FLA. STAT. §§517.08, .09, .091 (1969).
79. See L. Loss & E. Cow=T, BLuE SKY LAW (1958).
80. See [1949-1950] FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIL REP. 476-78.
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The exemptive provisions of the state blue sky laws are varied,8 ' and most
are so elaborate that it is impossible to formulate a general statement with
S2
regard to the exemption of cooperatives from state security regulations
This difference in exemptive provisions apparently reflects varying attitudes
of state legislatures toward different types of cooperatives. 83 For example,
Florida does not uniformly exempt cooperatives as a class from compliance
with its security regulations;8 4 however, it does expressly exempt agricultural
cooperatives8- and apartment cooperatives. 86 The absence of similar exemptive provisions for consumer cooperatives is probably due to the infrequency
with which these entities have been organized in Florida. If consumer cooperatives can be successfully utilized in the economic rehabilitation of the
blighted urban areas in Miami, Jacksonville, or Tampa then, hopefully, the
legislature may provide statutory machinery that will encourage the organization and operation of these enterprises.
Potential Sources of Capital for Ghetto
Consumer Cooperatives
The underlying differences in economic purpose and structure between
cooperatives and general business corporations will likely give rise to different problems in meeting initial capital requirements. These problems may
become more acute when attempting to organize consumer cooperatives in
urban low-income areas. Organizers may find that ghetto residents cannot
afford membership-even at a cost of a few dollars per share. Yet, the consumer cooperative seems to be ideally suited to ghetto environments.8 1 Existing federal urban redevelopment programs may provide a valuable source of
capital to launch consumer cooperatives in depressed urban areas. The Small
Business Administration (SBA) is authorized under the Economic Opportunity Act88 to provide technical and financial assistance for the establish81. Because of the disparate treatment accorded cooperatives by state legislation, the
framers of the Uniform Securities Act deferred to the various legislatures rather than attempt to provide a specifically worded exemptive provision that would extend to the
many types of cooperatives. See UNIFORM Szcuarrizs Acr, Official Comment to Title (1956),
cited in L. Loss &E. Cownrr, BLuE SKY LAw 249, 862 (1958).
82. See L. Loss & E. Cow=nr, BLUE SKY LAW (1958). At least 14 state statutes contain
exemptions for securities issued by certain types of cooperatives: FA. STAT. §517.05 (1969);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§30-1434, -1435 (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121'A, §§137.3, .4 (Supp.
1971); IND. ANN. STAT. §25-855 (Burns 1967); IowA CODE ANN. §§502.4, .5 (Supp. 1970);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§17-1252 to -1270 et seq. (Supp. 1970); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 11OA,
§§3, 4 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§80.05-.07 (1968); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§15-2018 to
-2014 (1967); NM). CENT. CODE §§10-04-05 to -06 (Supp. 1969); Omo R.y. CODu ANN.
§§1707.02, .03 (Page Supp. 1970); S.D. COMPLED LAWS ANN. §§47-81-67 to -31-92 (1967);
Tzx. Ray. Crv. STAT. §581-6 (Vernon 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. §551.22 (1970).
83. L. Loss &E. Cownrr, BLUE SKY LAW 862 (1958).
84. See FIA. STAT. §§517.05, .06 (1969).
85. FIA. STAT. §517.05 (10) (1969).
86. F". STAT. §517.06(15) (1969).
87. CJ. D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 16, at 182-88.
88. 42 U.S.C. §§2902, 2906(b) (1964).
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ment of cooperatives in urban areas with high concentrations of unemployed or low-income individuals.8 9 An examination of the legislative history
of the Act reveals a clear intent on part of Congress to make Economic Opportunity loans available to organizations like consumer cooperatives, which
would aid in strengthening the economy of the ghetto and in providing jobs
and vocational training to the urban poor.90 However, in apparent contravention of this congressional intent, the SBA has excluded consumer cooperatives from eligibility for Economic Opportunity loans. 91
Apart from the Economic Opporunity program, the SBA might nevertheless provide an indirect source for cooperative funding. Generally, the SBA
will not lend to nonprofit organizations. 92 The agency has made an exception,
however, in the case of Local Development Corporations. 3 These pooling
vehicles help obtain capital and managerial expertise for disadvantaged
small business concerns. 94 The agency neither expressly nor impliedly excludes consumer cooperatives from the category of independent small businesses ,that may be established by local development corporations.95 Therefore,
consumer cooperatives might be eligible for loan funds from the SBA through
such an intermediary device. 96
The Economic Development Administration,97 established in 1965 and
administered by the Department of Commerce, 97 is another source of direct or
89. 42 U.S.C. §2906 (b) (1964).
90. See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2455 (1967). The House Education and Labor
Committee Report on the 1967 amendment to title rV of the Act (H.R. REP. No. 866, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)) makes it dear that a major focus of the economic opportunity loan
program should be on small business concerns: "(1) located in urban or rural areas having
high proportions of unemployed or low-income individuals or (2) owned by low-income
individuals." 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2455 (1967). The committee placed considerable emphasis on "[planning and research, identification and development of new business
opportunities, stimulation of new private capital resources . . establishment... of business service agencies . .. [and establishing] management training and counseling programs
of sufficient content to adequately prepare participants for the rigors of business competition." Id.

91. 13 C.F.R. §119.21 (d) (1968).
92. 13 C.F.R. §120.2 (d) (4) (1968). However, cooperatives comprised of groups of private
profit-centered businesses, seeking to increase purchasing power, are expressly made eligible
for Small Business Administration funds. Id.

93. 13 C.F.R. §108.2 (d) (1968).
94. Economic Development Corporations are nonprofit corporations, eligible to receive
grants and gifts under §501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, deductible to the
donors under §170 (b) (1) (A) (vi) of the Code. See Treas. Reg. §1.501 (c) (3)-i (d) (2) (1970).
See also Weston, Economic Development Corporations, 25 Bus. LAw. 219 (Special Issue

1969).
95. See 13 C.F.R. §§108.1-.502-1 (1968).
96. Id. §108.2 requires only that eligible small business concerns qualify as small
businesses under §§121.3-10 or .3-11 relating to economic standards. Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Companies (MESBIC) may also offer an avenue for funding
of consumer cooperatives. See 13 C.F.R. §107 (1967), as revised in 34 Fed. Reg. 1234 (1968)
and 35 Fed. Reg. 4596, 8673 (1970). A MESBIC must operate within SBA regulations, but
its transactions with small businesses are private arrangements and have no connection
with the SBA. Id.
97. Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. 3121 (Supp. V, 1969); 13 C.F.R. §§301.1-.63
(1970).
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guaranteed loans for low-income urban businesses, including, presumably,
consumer cooperatives.9 8 This agency also provides skill and expertise to prospective low-income businessmen. 9 In addition, the Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) was created in 1969 to provide a center for leadership
and coordination of the 116 related governmental aid programs administered
by different departments and agencies. 100 The OMBE may be able to provide considerable information on obtaining financial and technical assistance
from the federal government.
If the prospective cooperative will have a sufficiently large economic
and social impact in an urban depressed area, organizers may be able to
qualify for aid from one of the many large private foundations. For example,
the Ford Foundation has recently been engaged in several depressed area
redevelopment research projects.10 An innovative application of the cooperative entity as a vehicle through which investment and credit capital could
be generated and recycled within a low-income urban area might be quite
consistent with the goals of the Ford Foundation0 2 or other similar institutions.
Although the financing of a consumer cooperative in a depressed inner
city area will be more difficult without outside assistance from governmental
or private sources, the unavailability of such assistance should not completely discourage prospective cooperative organizers. Since organization and
motivation of key personnel are likely to present the biggest problem, co-op
promoters should seek the aid of functioning community organizations such
as churches, OEO community action groups, 0 3 and legal services offices. With
a sufficiently large number of prospective participants, it may be possible
to obtain the entire initial capital needs directly from the member-consumers.' 0 4
SELECTION OF THE FORM OF ENTITY

Possibly the most important consideration in the organizational process
is the selection of the appropriate entity under which the cooperative will

do business. The cooperative form appears to be adaptable to most currently
recognized business entities in the absence of express statutory limitations.
98. Id. In order to be eligible for assistance, prospective applicants must reside in an
urban area designated by the Economic Development Administration as a target area for
their aid. Designation is based on unemployment and median family income levels. Id.
99. See Vazquez, The Role of the Department of Commerce in the Development of
Minority Business Enterprises, 25 Bus. LAw. 55 (Special Issue 1969).
100. Exec. Order No. 11,458 (March 5, 1969), 34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (1969).
101. Atterbury, Experiments in Making Foundation Credit Available to the Poor, 25
Bus. LAw. 21 (Special Issue 1969).
102. Id. at 22.
103. See 45 C.F.R. §1060.1-2 (1971). Consumer cooperatives, if organized to improve
living standards of the poor, are within the goals specified by the OEO for Community
Action Program grantees. 45 C.F.R. §1078.1-7 (1971).
104. For example, the Harlem River ConsumerWs Cooperative obtained $270,000 in equity
capital from fewer than 100 Harlem residents. Walker, The Role of the Attorney in a
Community.Owned and Operated Cooperative, 25 Bus. LAw. 195 (Special Issue 1969).
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Cooperatives are generally considered to embody a number of common
characteristics, including: substantially equal control and ownership by each
member, limited membership on the basis of patronage, limited return on
members' invested capital, limited (or prohibited) transfer of ownership interest, economic benefits to patrons, limited personal liability of obligations
of the association in the absence of a direct undertaking or authorization by
members, and emphasis on cash-basis transaction.' 0 5 However, there is no
absolute test to determine whether a particular organization is truly cooperative in character. 0 At least one court has determined that the cooperative
enjoys a hybrid existence sharing some qualities of a corporation, partnership, and a joint stock association.07 This hybrid existence permits the
cooperative to operate within the legal framework of an unincorporated
association, a non-profit corporation, a regular corporation or a corporation
organized under special cooperative incorporation statutes. 0 8 One of these
entities is likely to prove more suitable within a particular jurisdiction.
Retail-charge Versus Direct-charge Method
One important determination to be made in choosing the proper form
is whether the cooperative will be operated on a retail-charge or direct-charge
basis. Traditionally, consumer cooperatives have utilized the retail-charge
method, purchasing goods at wholesale costs and reselling them to memberpatrons at prevailing market retail prices. 0 9 After deducting operating costs
and retaining a small sum for expenses and contingencies, net savings are returned to the member patrons."0O Transactions with member patrons are
generally on a cash basis."'
In contrast, there are two methods of dealing on a direct-charge basis.
In the first method the cooperative acts merely as an agent for its members,2
making purchasing arrangements with wholesalers and manufacturers;"1
this method has proved to be successful in marketing durable goods such as
furniture. In the second method, which is more suitable in marketing perishable goods, the cooperative purchases and then resells items at wholesale
costs." 8 Operating costs such as salaries, rent, and utilities are usually assessed
through small service charges that are added to wholesale costs." 4 This sys105. PAcKEL, supra note 40, at 4-5. See Rose, Direct Charge Cooperatives: Legal Aspects
of a New Strategy in the War on Poverty, 38 GEo. WASH. L. RaY. 958 (1970).
106. Keystone Auto. Club Cas. Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 886, 889, 891 (3d Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 814 (1942).
107. School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Franlford Grocery Co., 376 Pa. 542, 551, 103 A.2d
738, 742 (1954).
108. See generally PAcxE., supra note 40, at 52-62.

109. Rose, supra note 105, at 958.
110. Id. at 959.
111. Id.
112. Shadden, A Model Consumer Action Program for Low Income Neighborhoods 6
(Department of Church Planning, Church Federation of Greater Chicago, May 1966).
113. Rose, supra note 105, at 960.
114. Id.
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tern makes no allowance for the accumulation of capital, but rather passes
savings directly to member patrons in the form of lower prices for goods.
Any excess of collected service charges over and above actual expenses may
be returned at the end of the year.115
The Unincorporated Cooperative Association
In its early stages of growth, a consumer cooperative may take the form
of a voluntary, unincorporated association, which is merely a body of persons united in a common purpose and acting in concert."16 In the absence of
special statutes, cooperative associations are usually governed by the same
legal principles as are other associations and clubs."17
The powers of the unincorporated association are determined by the constitution or articles of association, and bylaws""" that constitute a contract
between members and the association." 9 The scope of the association's
rights and liabilities may be determined by the constitution and bylaws and
is limited only to matters reasonably consonant with the purposes for which
the cooperative was formed, subject to the laws of the appropriate jurisdiction. 20 These documents may include provisions for such matters as voting
rights,' 21 disposition of interests of members upon expulsion or withdrawal,'22and methods of raising funds.' 2' In addition, the association agreement may
be combined with another agreement, such as a purchasing contract, in
24
which case both agreements will be construed together.
115. Annual rebates are still possible over assessments on a weekly or monthly basis.

Cf. id.
116. H. OLxcx, NoN-PRoFrr COP.PORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND AssociATioNs 6 (2d ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as H. OLEcK].
117. Cf. PAcGREL, supra note 40, at 28-29.
118. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Early Grain & Elevator Co., 206 S.W. 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
119. See, e.g., Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 618-19, 50 P. 763, 764 (1897); Taite v.
Bradley, 151 So. 2d 474, 475 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1963); American Live-Stock Comm'n Co. v.
Chicago Live-Stock Exch., 143 Ill. 210, 228, N.E. 274, 278 (1892).
120. See, e.g., Rogers v. Boston Club, 205 Mass. 261, 269-70, 91 N.E. 21, 325 (1910); Weinstock v. Ladisky, 197 Misc. 859, 871, 98 N.Y.S.2d 85, 97 (Sup. Ct. 1950). Ordinarily, courts will
not interfere with the enforcement of rules or bylaws of the association unless the
methods of enforcement or the laws by themselves are unreasonable, immoral, or contrary
to public policy. Even in these instances, however, courts will intervene only after members
have exhausted their internal remedies. Harper v. Hoecherl, 153 Fla. 29, 33, 14 So. 2d 179,
181 (1943).
121. See Detwiler v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dickinson, 131 Pa. 614, 18 A. 990 (1890).
122. When adequate notice and hearing have been given, and in the absence of fraud
or bad faith, courts will not generally review the sufficiency of the cause for the expulsion
of a member by his association. State v. Florida Yacht Club, 106 So. 2d 207, 211 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. (1958). Courts have upheld bylaws providing for the retention of a member's
property following expulsion. See Driscoll v. East-West Dairymen's Ass'n, 52 Cal. App. 2d
468, 126 P.2d 467 (1942); cf. Clearwater Citrus Growers' Ass'n v. Andrews, 81 Fla. 299, 87 So.
903 (1921).
123. Reno Lodge No. 99, I.O.O.F., Hutchinson v. Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F., 54 Kan. 73,
37 P. 1003 (1894).
124. Cf. Brame v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 212 Ky. 185, 278 S.W.
597 (1925).
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The voluntary association form may offer a distinct advantage to small or
embryonic cooperatives, in that there are few statutory guidelines with which
they must comply. On the other hand, there are certain inherent disadvantages in doing business as a voluntary unincorporated association. Most of
these liabilities stem from the well-established principle that, absent special
statutory provisions, this form does not represent a legal entity distinct from
that of its individual members.

2

5

The lack of legal recognition of an unin-

corporated cooperative may severely hamper the organization in its day-to-day
business operations and may also serve to render the individual members
liable for wrongful actions taken by officers or by other members.
Power to Contract. The legal problems affecting contractual relations
are likely to be of most significant importance to the unincorporated association since the consumer cooperative will be continually engaging in contractual arrangements. In at least one jurisdiction an association may, by statute,
be given the power to contract. 26 In the absence of such a statutory provision,
however, an association has no legal power to contract 27 and cannot ratify

a contract. 128 However, members of the association may incur liability under
general agency principles. The liability of individual members for contracts
executed by officers or other members of the voluntary cooperative association
will, in the absence of applicable statutory authority, be determined by prin29
ciples of express, implied, or apparent authority.
Ordinarily, a member of an unincorporated association has no general
authority to contract for the association. 30 However, such authority may be
granted expressly by an association or it may be implied from the customary
duties of the member. 13 Likelihood of a determination of member liability,
of course, becomes more acute with respect to contracts executed by the of32
ficers of the cooperative.
Florida does not grant statutory power to voluntary associations or their
officers or members to enter into contractual arrangements. It was established
at an early date in this state that a member or officer of an association who
purports to bind the association as principal, binds himself. 33 This rule was

125.

H. OtacK, supra note 116, at 93.

126. NJ. STAT.

ANN.

§2A:64-1 (2) (Supp. 1970).

127. E.g., Hunt v. Adams, 1II Fla. 164, 149 So. 24 (1933).
128. E.g., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Kaiser, 174 Va. 229, 6 SXE.2d

562 (1939).
129. Reese v. Levin, 124 Fla. 96, 168 So. 851 (1936).
130. See, e.g., McConnell v. Denver, 35 Cal. 365 (1868); Cousin v. Taylor, 115 Ore. 472,

239 P. 96 (1925).
131. See, e.g., Cherry v. Chicago &A.R. Co., 191 Mo. 489, 90 S.W. 381 (1905).
132. See Boyce v. Hart, 8 App. Div. 2d 916, 187 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1959), where
members of an association were held liable on a contract made by an officer without
original authority after the contract had been ratified by the members with full knowledge of the facts.
133. Henry Pilcher & Sons, Inc. v. Martin, 102 Fla. 672, 136 So. 386 (1931); LW. Phillips
& Co. v. Hall, 99 Fla. 1206, 128 So. 635 (1930).
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first stated in I. W. Phillips Sc Co. v. Hall."4 A group of trustees were held
individually liable on a note purportedly executed on behalf of its church. 3 5
The principle was later modified to the effect that outside creditors, who have
knowledge of the legal nonexistence of a principal or who consent not to
bind the agent with whom they are dealing, will be left entirely without
legal remedy.'3 6 Because of this rule, outside parties may understandably be
quite reluctant to extend credit to consumer cooperatives operating as volun3
tary, unincorporated associations.2
Tort Liability. Unincorporated associations are under the same duties
and liabilities as other principals with respect to torts committed by their
members. 3 In general, a principal is liable for torts committed by its agents
while acting within the scope of their employment. 139 However, since the association has no separate legal identity, liability for tortious acts committed
by officers or members within the scope of their authority may be imputed
to all the members of the association.140 It would therefore be wise for officers
and members of unincorporated cooperatives to attempt to insulate themselves from possible tort liability through insurance and bonding.14'
Power To Acquire and To Hold Property. In some
ing Florida, an association cannot convey or receive
name. 1 2 However, property may, in most instances, be
trust to the cooperative officers or other representatives

jurisdictions, includproperty in its own
conveyed by deed of
as trustees.' 43

Power To Sue or To Be Sued. In the absence of an enabling or permissive
statute, 44 an unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued in its own
134.
135.
136.
So. 409

99 Fla. 1206, 128 So. 635 (1930).
Id.
Hunt v. Adams, 111 Fla. 164, 149 So. 24 (1933); Bryce v. Bull, 106 Fla. 336, 143
(1932).

137. A similar problem faces emerging tenant unions. Because of their nonrecognition
as legal entities, it is often difficult to persuade landlords to enter into bargaining agreements.
Note, Tenant Unions: Their Law and Operation in the State and Nation, 23 U. FLA. L.

REV. 79, 87 (1971). See also, Note, Hazards of Enforcing Claims Against Unincorporated
Associations in Florida, 17 U. FLA. L. Rav. 211, 212 (1964).
138. See, e.g., Baird v. National Health Foundation, 235 Mo. App. 594, 144 S.W.2d
850 (1940).
139. See, e.g., Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark.
1953); Kelly v. Wallace, 6 Fla. 690 (1856).
140. See PACKEL, supra note 40, at 196-200.
141. Rose, supra note 105, at 963. The Peabody Store, an unincorporated cooperative
association, attempted to limit its liability by having each member agree not to sue the
other members. The members agreed that if the organization were sued its liability should
not exceed its assets. Similar agreements were sought with wholesalers and others frequenting the store. The author pointed out that insurance should nevertheless be obtained
for injuries to outsiders. Id.
142. See, e.g., Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362 (1879); Full Gospel Temple v. Redd,
82 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1955).
143. Full Gospel Temple v. Redd, 82 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1955).
144. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, §142 (1958); McNulty v. Higginbothom, 252 Ala. 218,
40 So. 2d 414 (1949).
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name. 145 This rule is well established in Florida and except in cases in which
associations are treated as partnerships,'4 6 no actions will lie unless all
members are joined and served individually. 147 The practical impact of this
procedural rule on the day-to-day operations of the cooperative association is
that the organization may be severely restricted in business dealings in which
legal rights and duties may be of ultimate concern. For example, it may be
difficult for unincorporated cooperatives to obtain credit from outsiders who
are apprehensive of the procedural difficulties in recovering from the association should foreclosure become necessary.
Treatment of Unincorporated Cooperative as a Partnership.Another possible problem in many jurisdictions, including Florida, is that an unincorporated association that is organized for profit may be legally deemed to be
a partnership. 148 Although there may be persuasive arguments that consumer purchasing cooperatives, especially those organized partially for purposes of urban economic redevelopment, should be deemed to be nonprofit
in character, 49 the possible consequences of being determined to be a partnership could be most detrimental and should not be overlooked. 5 0
The element of intent is the most significant criterion the courts apply
when deciding whether an organization is or is not a partnership.' 5 ' Consequently, perhaps the best argument with which to rebut an assertion of
partnership is that the members, in joining the cooperative, did not have
the requisite intent to become partners since they did not intend to participate actively in the management of the business or to undertake the fiduciary
responsibilities consonant with partnership status. This argument should be

145. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1927); Montgomery Ward &cCo. v.
Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948); Florio v. State, 119 So. 2d 305 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
146. Cf. Johnston v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 1285, 1288-91, 134 So. 563, 565 (1931).
147. See, e.g., Santa Rosa Medical Soc'y v. Spires, 153 So. 2d 325 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963);
Florio v. State, 119 So. 2d 305 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960). However, action may be maintained
against an unincorporated association for purposes of subjecting its property to an equitable
lien where no personal judgment is sought against the association. Ross v. Gerung, 69 So.
2d 650 (Fla. 1954).
148. F.J. Dubos &cCo. v. Hoover, Jones & Bowden, 25 Fla. 720, 6 So. 788 (1889).
149. Rose, supra note 105, at 972.
150. It is well established that death, bankruptcy, or other legal incapacity of a partner
dissolves a partnership. See, e.g., UNFORM PARTNERsHIP ACr §§31 (4), (5) [hereinafter cited

as U.P.A.]; Fillyau v. Laverty, 3 Fla. 72 (1856). In addition, in Florida a partnership may
be dissolved at the will of any partner when no definite terms or particular undertaking
are specified in the partnership agreement. Hirsch v. Bartels, 49 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1950).
Under the Uniform Partnership Act and under Florida law, each partner has equal rights
in the management and conduct of the partnership business, and the acts of each partner
within the scope of the partnership objectives bind all other partners. U.P.A. §18(a);
Proctor v. Hearne, 100 Fla. 1180, 131 So. 173 (1930). Obviously, the consequences of a
determination that a cooperative is legally a partnership and a concomitant application
of these legal principles to a consumers' purchasing organization with several hundred
members could be catastrophic.
151. See, e.g., UNIFORM LAws ANN., UNIFORM PARTNEsIsmp ACr §7 n.4. See also Nelson
v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 269 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1959); Stephens v. Orman, 10 Fla. 9 (1862).
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especially persuasive in the case of direct-charge cooperatives, since these
organizations act as mere conduits, procuring for their members requested
1 2
goods and services. 5
Incorporated Cooperatives
Because of the many hazards inherent in operating a cooperative under
the voluntary, unincorporated association form, organizers should carefully
consider three alternative forms of incorporation-either under a special purpose cooperative statute, under nonprofit corporation laws, or under the general business corporation laws. Incorporation would almost certainly be
advisable for the large retail-charge cooperatives because of the advantages of
limited liability for officers and members. The corporate form also affords
additional convenience of operation and facilitation of credit for the cooperative organization.
Special Purpose Cooperative Statutes. Several states have enacted statutes
specifically for the incorporation of consumer cooperatives. 153 These statutes
do not restrict the cooperative to operation within traditional "corporate
norms" and usually embody provisions particularly compatible with cooperative principles and methods of operation. 54 The Cooperative League of
America and other authorities recommend that, in the absence of a special
purpose cooperative statute in the resident state, it may often be advantageous for cooperative organizers to incorporate under a special cooperative
55
statute of a foreign state.
The District of Columbia statute on consumer cooperatives 58 has been characterized as the most ideally suited for incorporation.157 This statute requires
only nominal filing and incorporation fees 5 8 and permits organization on
either a stock or nonstock basis, membership certificates serving in lieu of
shares in the latter case.5 9 The one-man, one-vote principle is expressly recognized by the District of Columbia statute. 6 0 Moreover, voting agreements
and proxy arrangements are prohibited so as to prevent circumvention of
cooperative principles of operation.161 In addition, the Act permits a referendum on acts of directors upon petition of ten per cent of the members or
152.
153.
§§29-801
154.
155.

Rose, supra note 105, at 960.
See, e.g., CAL. ANN. CoRP. CoDE §§12200 et seq. (West 1964); D.C. ConE ANN.
et seq. (1968); ILL STAT. ANN. §§305 et seq. (1969); Wis. STAT. §§185 et seq. (1969).
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§29-801 to -847 (1968).
PACKEL, supra note 40, at 62; TIME To ORGANIZE? 1 (The Cooperative League of

the USA (1969)).
156. D.C. CODE ANN. §29-806 (1968).
157. PAcKEL, supra note 40, at 61; Miller, Increasing Low-Income Consumer Buying
and Borrowing Power by Cooperative Action, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 709, 715 (1968); TIME To
ORGAIZE?, supra note 155, at 1, 2.
158. D.C. CODE ANN. §29-806 (1968).
159. D.C. CoDE ANN. § §29-805 (7), -825 (1968).
160. D.C. CODE ANN. §29-813 (1968).
161. D.C. CODE ANN. §29-813 (1968).
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a majority of the directors so long as third-party creditors are not preju62
diced.1
Contrary to normal corporate practice,'1 63 provision is made by the Dis16 4
trict of Columbia statute for mandatory payment of patronage dividends.
Ten per cent of the net savings of the cooperative are required to be placed annually in a reserve fund until such time as the reserve fund equals fifty per
cent of paid-in capital. 165 This fund, used for general conduct of the business,
provides creditors with some assurance of cooperative liquidity. A portion of
the remainder of the net savings must be allocated to a fund for cooperative
education; 6 6 some may also be allocated for the general welfare of the members; and the remaining net savings are allocated at a uniform rate to all
patrons in proportion to their patronage. 67 A Florida-based cooperative desiring to incorporate under the District of Columbia cooperative incorporation statute would simply register with the Secretary of State as a foreign
1 68
corporation.
Nonprofit Statutes. In some states nonprofit statutes may provide a suitable alternative to selection of a foreign, special-purpose cooperative stat70
ute.'19Usually the articles of incorporation are relatively simple to prepare
and filing fees are nominalY' In addition, there is generally no minimum
capital requirement before incorporation is permitted."7 2 These statutes
provide the advantages of incorporation (limited liability, the right to contract, to hold and acquire property, and to sue and be sued in the corporate
162.

D.C. CODE ANN. §29-821 (1968).

163. See, e.g., FLA.

STAT.

§608.09 (Supp. 1970).

164. D.C. CODE ANN. §29-831 (4) (1968).
165. D.C. CODE ANN. §29-831 (1) (1968).
166. D.C. CODE ANN. §29-831 (3) (1968). This educational purpose lends support to the

argument that the consumer cooperative serves a social purpose beyond pecuniary benefit
to its members. See also Mississippi Valley Portland Cement Co. v. United States, 408
F.2d 827, 833-34 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 US. 944 (1969), wherein the court implies that the cooperative patrons must possess some degree of horizontal similitude beyond
being investors. See text accompanying notes 239-241 infra.
167. D.C. CoDE ANN. §§29-831 (4)(a)-(d) (1968). Savings returns are equivalent to the
patron's proportionate share of the cooperative's gross income minus taxes, cost of goods
sold, and operational and business expenses.
168. E.g., as a general foreign corporation under FLA. STAT. §613.01 (1969) or as a
foreign nonprofit corporation under FLA. STAT. §617.11 (1969). The latter provision may
afford foreign nonprofit corporations broader powers than resident nonprofit corporations.
In [1959-1960] FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REi. 769 a nonprofit corporation, organized under
the nonprofit corporation statutes of another state for the purpose of operating and
managing a cooperative apartment house on a cooperative basis without capital stock, was
permitted to do business in Florida as a nonprofit corporation. This was permitted despite
the fact that one writer has suggested that a cooperative apartment house could not be
incorporated under Florida's Nonprofit Corporation Statute. Anderson, Cooperative Apart.
ments in Florida: A Legal Analysis, 12 U. MiAMI L. REV. 13, 17 (1957).
169.
170.
171.
172.

PACKEL, supra note 40, at 57-59.
E.g., FLA. STAT. §617.013 (1) (1969).
E.g., FLA. STAT. §617.015 (1) (1969).
E.g., FLA. STAT. §617.013 (1969).
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name)173 without subjecting the cooperative to restrictive compliance with
traditional corporate norms.174 Thus, application under a nonprofit statute
usually presents few mechanical or procedural difficulties.
The primary obstacle to adoption of this business form is the basic problem of qualification as a nonprofit corporation. In the abstract, the term
"nonprofit" is of limited utility and has given rise to considerable conflict
and confusion. A corporation may in reference to certain matters, such as
capital stock 75 or license taxes, 176 be deemed a corporation-for-profit. Yet
such a determination may have little relevance to whether the organization
is considered to be nonprofit within the meaning of nonprofit corporation
statutes.

1 77

For example, in School District of Philadephia v. Frankford Grocery
a school district sought to recover a tax on the gross receipts of a
grocery cooperative incorporated under a general business corporation statute.
The statute in question required a tax from "every person engaging in any
business in any school district."'' 79 The term "business" was defined by the
statute as "carrying on or exercising for gain or profit . . . any trade [or]
business."'80 In holding the cooperative exempt from taxation the court reviewed the origin and economic purpose of cooperative enterprises, and dis8
tinguished them from normal business entities, stating:' '
Co.,' 7 8

When a group of individuals enter into an agreement to pool their
resources for a common purpose and state therein that their contributions to the extent not required for that purpose shall be repaid to
them, it is hard to conceive how the contributions returned to them
should be regarded
as a gain or profit to the entity acting as their
82
mutual agent.'
When determining the scope of operations permissible under a nonprofit
statute, the courts appear to be concerned not so much with whether a cor173. E.g., FLA. STAT. §617.021 (1969).
174. See text accompanying notes 207-220 infra.
175. [1957-1958] FLA. Ar'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 722.
176. [1959-1960] FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 769.
177. The Florida attorney general has stated that the capital stock and real and
personal property of agricultural marketing associations, organized under FLA. STAT. ch. 618
(1969), are subject to taxation. See [1959-1960] FLA. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 769; [19451946] FLA. Aa-r'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 662. Yet, FLA. STAT. §618.01(4) (1969), states that
such associations "shall be deemed non-profit, inasmuch as they are not organized to make
profit for themselves, as such, or for their members, as such."
178. 376 Pa. 542, 103 A.2d 738 (1954).
179. Id. at 546, 103 A.2d at 740.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 551, 103 A.2d at 742.
182. But see Miami Beach College Corp. v. Tomlinson, 143 Fla. 57, 59, 196 So. 608,
609 (1940). In that case the City of Miami Beach sought to enforce the imposition of a
business license tax on a private college incorporated under the Florida Not-for-Profit
Corporation Statute, FLA. STAT, ch. 617 (1969). In holding the college liable for the profits
tax, the court did not concern itself with the question of whether the corporation was
operating on a nonprofit basis within the meaning of the statute under which it was
chartered. 143 Fla. 61, 63, 196 So. 608, 609 (1940).
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poration had made or plans to make a profit, but whether the money will
be used in a manner consistent with the purposes for which the statute was
enacted. 183 As an example, the Ohio supreme court in Ohio ex rel. Russell v.
Sweeney' 84 upheld a decision by the secretary of state denying incorporation
of a purportedly nonprofit corporation. The promoters had planned to acquire an existing corporation for profit and to use corporate earnings for community development purposes. 8 5 The holding was based on two conclusions:
first, the charter provisions vested unduly broad authority in the directors,
empowering them to act in a manner that might conceivably exceed the
stated purposes of the charter. 86 Second, even if the directors acted in a
manner wholly consistent with the stated corporate objectives, those corporate
purposes would be outside the scope of activities contemplated by the relevant nonprofit statute.1'8 The court conceded that direct pecuniary benefit
would not be conferred upon the shareholders under the charter provisions.
However, most of the shareholders, as beneficiaries of the community development program, would receive an indirect economic benefit from the corporation. The court found this element of indirect pecuniary gain to shareholders to contravene the purposes for which the governing nonprofit statute
was enacted. 8 8 Following a similar rationale in sustaining a quo warranto
attack on a chartered nonprofit corporation, the Washington supreme court
in State v. Lumbermen's Clinic stated: 8 9
Profit does not necessarily mean a direct return by way of dividends,
interest, capital account or salaries. A saving of expense which would
otherwise necessarily be incurred is also a profit to the person benefited.
Consequently, the utility of nonprofit statutes for incorporation of consumer cooperatives may depend upon whether the indirect economic benefits,
which inure to members as a result of their participation in the cooperative,
are deemed to constitute a distribution of corporate "profits" to the members,
incidental to corporate activities.- 9 One authority, conceding that the economic benefit accruing to cooperative members might be considered a "profit,"
nevertheless argues in favor of a nonprofit status for cooperatives and distinguishes these entities from normal business corporations on yet another
183. The Florida supreme court has stated that the fact that profits result from a
nonprofit corporation is entirely consistent with the not-for-profit character of the corporation, as long as profits are used for purposes intended by the not-for-profit statute and
are not diverted to shareholders. Miami Retreat Foundation, Inc. v. Ervin, 62 So. 2d 748
(1952), construing Fla. Stat. §617.01 (1951), cf. State v. State Racing Comm'n, 116 Fla.
144, 156 So. 343 (1934), in which a not-for-profit corporation was denied a permit to
operate a dog racing club although the charter specified that profits would be devoted to

charitable purposes.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

153 Ohio St. 66, 91 N.E.2d 13 (1950).
Id. at 68, 91 N.E.2d at 14.
Id. at 70-72, 91 N.E.2d at 16.
Id.
Id.
186 Wash. 384, 394-95, 58 P.2d 812, 816 (1936).

190.

Cf. H. OLEcK, supra note 116, at 1.
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basis."" The ordinary business corporation deals primarily with third persons. When profits are derived through corporate dealings with these third
persons and are in turn distributed to shareholders, there is no question as
to the characterization of such corporations as "for-profit." 192 The true cooperative, however, enables members to obtain "profits" resulting from the
activities of the members themselves; therefore, the cooperative should not
be considered as carrying on "for-profit" activities.193
This argument may be somewhat tenuous in the case of consumer cooperatives since members are not really dealing with themselves except in pooling their buying power. They are instead dealing with third persons and
utilizing the cooperative as a conduit. The issue remains whether savings resulting from membership are to be deemed "a profiL"'' 94 Perhaps a better
basis on which to ground an argument of nonprofit status would be that of
the purpose behind organizing and operating the cooperative. 195 It could be
argued that social and educational objectives outweigh possible individual
economic benefits in a consumer cooperative organized to facilitate economic
development of a low-income community. 196
Courts in several states have upheld the incorporation and operation of
cooperatives under nonprofit statutes. 97 However, the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act' specifically precludes the organization of cooperatives under
its provisions.
The FloridaNot-For-Profit Corporation Statute. The availability of Florida's not-for-profit corporation act' 99 for cooperative incorporation and operation is somewhat questionable. The statute specifies that a corporation "for
lawful purposes" but "not for pecuniary profit" may be organized thereunder.20o "Profit" is not specifically defined; however, no dividends or other
corporate income may be distributed to members, directors, or officers. 201
Whether cooperatives can utilize the not-for-profit statute will most likely
turn on a determination of whether the indirect economic benefit derived as
an incident to membership (savings on purchasing of goods and services)

191. PAcKEL, Supra note 40, at 59.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. For an interesting discussion in which an affirmative answer to this question is
given, see Note, Non-Profit Corporations-Definition, 17 VAND. L. REv. 336 (1963).
195. H. OL xe, supra note 116, at 1-2. The author suggests that when the dominant
motives of an organization axe ethical, moral, or social the organization should be considered
nonprofit for purposes of incorporation under the usual nonprofit statute.
196. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
197. See, e.g., Milk Producers' Marketing Co. v. Bell, 234 Ill. App. 222 (1924); Burley
Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Rogers, 88 Ind. App. 469, 150 N.E. 384 (1926).
198. ABA-ALI MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION Acr §4 (1957). But see R. BoYER,
NONPROFIT CORPORATION STATUTES: A CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL 129-34 (1957).
199. FLA. STAT. ch. 617 (1969).
200. FLr.A.
STAT. §617.01 (1969).

201. Id. §617.011.
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constitutes a "pecuniary profit." 20 2 This question has never been decided by
the Florida courts; however, an opinion by the Florida attorney general
appears to indicate that indirect economic benefit is not tantamount to "pecuniary profit" within the meaning of the statute.20 3 This opinion stated that
a corporation organized for the purpose of securing benefits for members
under the federal housing program could probably be incorporated under
the not-for-profit corporation statute.20 4 This opinion adds validity to
the earlier suggestions that educational and social purposes of the proposed
cooperative may be determinative in applying for incorporation under the notfor-profit act. 5
General Corporation Statutes. As a third alternative, consumer cooperative
organizers may wish to consider incorporating under general business corporation statutes. However, compliance with federal security registration requirements may be more difficult for the cooperative organized as a general busi206
ness corporation.
General corporation statutes may pose other difficulties, especially in jurisdictions that strictly adhere to traditional "corporate norms."20 7 Broad discre202. Compare PAcKEL, supra note 40, at 57-59, with Note, Non-Profit CorporationsDefinition, 17 Van). L. REv. 36 (1963). See also R. PATrERSON, THE TAX EXEMPTION OF
Coomuxrv

13-15

(1961) where it is argued that patronage dividends do not represent

earnings on profits from corporate activities but are mere refunds of overcharges on goods
and services.

[1959-1960] FLA. Arr'v GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 769.
204. Id.
205. In view of the lack of case law concerning cooperative organization under
Florida's not-for-profit corporation statute, it is recommended that organizers and counsel
consult the offices of the secretary of state or attorney general prior to attempting to incorporate under this statute. In the absence of a more persuasive authority, it may be
noted that the Fraternity Purchasing Association of Gainesville, Florida was granted a
not-for-profit charter in 1961. This organization operates under traditional cooperative
principles, providing food commodities and certain services to member fraternity organizations on a direct-charge basis. Fraternity Purchasing Association of Gainesville, Florida
Charier and Bylaws. There is another problem posed by the Florida not-for-profit statute.
FLA. STAT. §617.01 (1969) provides that if a not-for-profit corporation can incorporate under
any other law of this state, it may not be incorporated under the not-for-profit statute.
FLA. STAT. §§608.03(1) (b), .13(12) (Supp. 1970) expressly provides for the incorporation
of cooperatives as general business corporations. These provisions construed together would
therefore seem to preclude the incorporation of cooperatives as not-for-profit corporations.
It might be argued, however, that a cooperative that issues membership certificates rather
than shares of stock should be entitled to incorporate under the not-for-profit act since
the general corporation act seemingly contemplates only corporations in which shares of
stock are issued. See FLA. STAT. §608.03 (2) (c) (Supp. 1970).
206. See text accompanying notes 50-75 supra.
207. PAcKEL, supra note 40, at 60. In each state the statutory and relevant case law
should be carefully scrutinized by counsel to insure that restrictions and limitations upon
centralization of power and discretion in the board of directors, maximum amount of
203.

share ownership, voting power, and return on capital investment can be effected in keeping
with traditional principles of cooperative operation. Transfer of shares will not ordinarily
pose a problem for the cooperative. Cooperatives organized under general corporation

laws can normally limit the transferability of shares, State v. Sho-me Power Coop., 356 Mo.
832, 204 S.W.2d 276 (1947); cf. Elliot v. Lindquist, 356 Pa. 385, 52 A.2d 180 (1947). Where
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tionary powers are generally accorded the board of directors in the management of corporate business. 20 8 For example, payment of dividends is traditionally within the province of board discretion.2°9 The only manner in
which stockholders can object to a board decision regarding the withholding
of dividends, short of discharging directors for valid cause, is to bring a deby a board of
rivative action; 210 and courts will not override a decision
21
directors without a showing of an abuse of discretion. 1
22 3
Proxy voting, allowed in most jurisdictions 212 and mandatory in some,
provides another means by which cooperative aims could be frustrated. This
is the traditional method used by corporate management to effectuate long214
range control and stability and, in many cases, to stifle shareholder dissent.
Such procedures are incompatible with the purposes of cooperatives since
democracy in voting and equality in control represent the cornerstone of cooperative principles of operation. 2 5 Finally, substantial paid-in capital requirements, initial filing fees, and periodic extensive reporting requirements
may prove to be cumbersome and unrealistic to cooperatives incorporated
under general business corporation statutes.
The Florida General Corporation Statute. The Florida general corpora217
tion statute216 expressly provides for the incorporation of cooperatives.
Many of the characteristics of the cooperative form of operation are recognized in special provisions. 2 18 Therefore, it would appear that the Florida

there are obstacles in placing restraint on the alienation of shares, the desired result can
often be accomplished by the establishment of voting trusts. E.g., CAL. ANN. COP. CODE
§§2230, 2231 (West 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. §218 (1955). Strict compliance with statutory
terms may be mandatory, e.g., Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 180 A.2d 58 (Sup.

Ct. 1957).
208. E.g., Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Peters, 175 So. 2d 54 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); see H.
CORPORA77ONS 550-54 (rev. ed. 1946).
209. E.g., Reid v. Long Island Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 198 Misc. 460, 98
N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff"d, 277 App. Div. 888, 98 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't 1950);

BALLANTINE,

FLA. STAT. §608.131 (1969). See H. BALLANINE, COrORATIONS 550-54 (rev. ed. 1946). Patron-

age refunds should not be considered excess corporate profits but may be said to be at least
equitably owned by the members. As previously discussed, this distinction is recognized
by the District of Columbia cooperative statute, D.C. CODE ANN. §29-831 (4) (1968). See text
accompanying notes 163-167 supra.
210. E.g., FLA. STAT. §608.131 (1969).
211. E.g., Williams v. Green Bay & Western R.R., 526 U.S. 549 (1946). As a practical
matter, however, the deduction from income tax given cooperatives upon the payment of
certain patronage dividends might minimize this problem. See text accompanying notes
258-261 infra,
212. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 407-09 (rev'd. ed. 1946).
213. E.g., FLA. STAT. §608.10(5) (Supp. 1970).
214. J. GALBRArrH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE 61 (Signet ed. 1967).
215. J. MARn & G. SMrrH, THE CoNsuMER INTER sT 21-22 (1968).
216. FLA. STAT. ch. 608 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
217. FLA. STAT. §§608.08(1) (b), .18(12) (Supp. 1970).
218. FLA. STAT. §608.15(12) (Supp. 1970) provides, in part, that a cooperative may:

"(a) Limit and regulate the right of stockholders to transfer their stock and provide terms

and limitations of stock; (b) Provide for the government of the association by the purely
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general corporation statute is more suitable for cooperative incorporation
than many business corporation statutes.
This recognition by the Florida Legislature of traditional cooperative
characteristics and modes of operation is salutary. Yet, these provisions may
not be of sufficient scope to preclude the necessity for Florida-based cooperatives to incorporate under foreign special-purpose cooperative statutes. For
instance, there are no special provisions preventing proxy voting or limiting
the amount of required initial paid-in capital. 219 Perhaps the main drawback
of these provisions is that they have not yet been subjected to the test of
judicial construction. Section 608.13 (12) (b) of the Florida Statutes, 1970
supplement, provides for government according to "the purely cooperative
custom of one-man, one-vote." It might be argued that this provision virtually
vitiates the traditional corporate norm embodied in section 608.09:220
The business of every corporation shall be managed and its corporate
powers exercised by a board of one or more directors ....
Whether the Florida courts will adopt this interpretation, however, cannot
be predicted at this time.
Summary. Because of the advantages of limited liability, the power to
contract, to buy and sell property, to sue and be sued as a legal entity, and
the concomitant benefit of more favorable treatment by commercial creditors
it is probably advisable for most consumer cooperatives to incorporate. Special purpose cooperative statutes are generally more suitable than general
22 1
business corporation statutes.
Cooperatives doing business as general corporations are probably more
likely to be required to register offerings of membership shares with the
Securties and Exchange Commission than are cooperatives with nonprofit
or special purpose charters since the latter generally place strict limitations
222
upon sharing of net earnings with members.
In states in which the availability of nonprofit statutes is in doubt, counsel might consider incorporating under a foreign special purpose statute,
such as the District of Columbia cooperative statute, and registering in the
22
member's state as a foreign nonprofit corporation. 3

cooperative custom of one man, one vote; and (c) Distribute earnings, wholly or in part,
on the basis of or in proportion to the amount of property bought from or sold to its
members or other customers or of labor performed for or services rendered to the association."
219. FLA. STAT. §608.13 (12) (Supp. 1970).
220. FL. STAT. §608.09(1) (Supp. 1970).
221. See text accompanying notes 156-168 supra.
222.

See, e.g., D.C. CoDE ANN. §29-822

(1968); FA. STAT. §617.011

(1969). See also

note 66 supra. Although cooperatives chartered as business corporations could be similarly
limited through their articles of incorporation from sharing profits with members, the
legality of such provisions might be doubtful in states that adhere strictly to the corporate
norm. E.g., FLA. STAT. §608.09 (1) (Supp. 1970). See text accompanying note 220 supra.
228. See note 168 supa.
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TAXATION OF CONSUMER COOPERATIVES

The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 expressly exempts farmer's cooperatives from income taxation.2 24 Although consumer cooperatives do not fall
within any express exemptive provisions they may nevertheless receive favorable tax treatment if they operate within certain specified guidelines. 2 This
favorable treatment includes a deduction to the cooperative upon payment of
certain types of patronage dividends2 26 and a delayed filing date of up to eight
and one-half months after the close of the taxable year.227 Patrons of consumer
cooperatives are also accorded special treatment. Patronage dividends that
would ordinarily be taxable to the patrons are not includable in their gross
income, provided these dividends are attributable to purchases of personal,
2
living, or family items. 28
Patronage Dividends
A "patronage dividend" is expressly defined in the Code as "an amount
paid to patron by an organization . . . on the basis of quantity or value of
business done with or for such patron ...."229 The business done with the
cooperative must be under a preexisting obligation to make the payment,
and the payment is determined by reference to the net earnings of the. or230
ganization from business done with or for its patrons.
The requirement of an obligation to make payment may be satisfied if
payments are required by state law or are paid pursuant to provisions of the
bylaws, articles of incorporation, or other written contract whereby the organization is obligated to make such payment. 23 While the Code does not state
that the obligation to make patronage dividends must be in writing,232 the

224. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §521 (a) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
225. For an exhaustive treatment of the history of the taxation of cooperatives and of
the application of Subchapter T to nonexempt cooperatives, see Logan, Federal Income
Taxation of Farmers and Other Cooperatives, 44 TExAs L. REV. 250, 1269 (pts 1-2) (1965-

1966).
226. CODE §1382 (b). See text accompanying 253-261 infra.
227. CODE §6072 (d). See text accompanying notes 269-270 infra.
228. CODE §1385(b). See text accompanying notes 253-261 infra.
229. CODE §1588 (a) (1).
230. CODE §§1388 (a) (2), (3). Subchapter T was inserted into the 1954 Code in 1962
to plug the loophole created by the decision in Long Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner,
249 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1967). In Long Poultry the cooperative deducted the face amounts
of certificates issued as patronage dividends. The certificates were considered of such contingent value that the recipient was not required to consider it as gross income. Subchapter
T was enacted to insure that the earnings of the cooperative will be taxed at either the
cooperative level or at the patron level. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-79
(1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 111-12 (1962).
231. Treas. Reg. §1.1388-1 (a). The Regulations provide that there can exist no power
to divert the profits from the patron to the benefit of others. Any such power, regardless
of whether it is exercised or not, will result in a loss of deduction. See, e.g., Fountain City
Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1949).
252. CODE §1388(a)(2).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss4/3

26

Black and Coleman:
The Organization
of Consumer
Cooperatives [Vol.
in theXXII
Ghetto
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW
Treasury Regulations specifically require that in order to obtain the deduc23
tion there must be a "valid enforceable written obligation."
Source of Patronage Dividends. In order to qualify as a patronage dividend the payment must be derived from profits or margins earned from the
patrons' business; the dividend cannot derive from business with others to
whom a smaller amount (or nothing) is paid with respect to substantially
identical transactions. 2 4 In addition, proceeds from business done with the
Government from the lease of property or from sales of capital assets are not
235
patronage.
In Mississippi Valley Portland Cement Co. v. United States230 the court
refused to allow a patronage deduction for dividends paid to patrons from
the proceeds of sales to nonmember patrons. In that case each shareholder
patron holding five shares of stock in the cooperative cement company was
entitled to purchase one barrel of cement at market price. Patronage dividends were made to the extent the market price per barrel exceeded its cost
of production and sales. 237 Failure by the patron to purchase the cement by
a certain date resulted in an assignment of the patron's purchasing rights to a
sales corporation. During 'the relevant year none of the patrons' purchase
rights were exercised. All cement produced by the cooperative was delivered
to the sales corporation for sale to the general public. The issue before the
court was whether the distribution to shareholders of the net profit of Portland Cement could be characterized as patronage dividends and therefore deductible. The court held that such dividends were not deductible since they
were not distinguishable from dividends paid by a traditional corporate en28
tity to its shareholders.
In holding that the dividends were not deductible, the court provided
some guidelines that reveal the nature of patronage dividends as contemplated

233. Treas. Reg. §1.1588-1 (a) (ii). Some courts have held that an informal understanding
with patrons, even if carried out in practice, will not permit a deduction. See, e.g., American Box Shook Export Ass'n v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1946); Beaver Valley
Canning Co., 9 CCH TAx CT. Mas. 1120 (1950). However, oral contracts for patronage

dividends have been effective for a deduction. See, e.g., Southwest Hardware Co., 24 T.C.
75 (1955), acquiesced in 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 9. With this conflict it is clear that to avoid
problems in claiming the patronage deduction the cooperative should take the precaution
of having a "valid enforceable written obligation" with its patrons as prescribed by the

Treasury Regulations.
234. Cona §1388 (a).
235. Logan, supra note 225, at 1272.
236. 408 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1969). This case is one of the few decisions in the area of
taxation of nonexempt consumer cooperatives.
257. Id. at 829.

238. Id. at 834. The court stated: "We have lifted the cooperative veil and have unmasked the economic realities of these transactions. Our conclusion is that the taxpayer's
shareholders were no more than paper patrons, and 'that the distribution to stockholders
was nothing more than a dividend paid out of profits of the corporation.' Peoples Gin Co.,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir. 1941, 118 F.2d 72, 73.... [S]hareholders
were merely investors and non-essential links in a conduit to the outside, not consumers of
the corporate product." Id. at 833-34.
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by the Code. First, because the cooperative provided for "prepackaged semiautomatic assignments 239 of its entire production, it was apparent that the
cooperative's purpose was not to supply its shareholders with cement at
reduced cost. Its purpose was to supply them with a return on their investment. Second, there was no "horizontal similitude among the stockholderpatrons" because the shareholders were a "variegated and disparate conglomerate." 20 The only thing the shareholders held in common was an investment that they hoped would be a profitable venture. Their relationship to
each other and to the cooperative was no different from that of shareholders
in any other publicly held corporation.241
It is apparent from this case that the form of the transaction will not
govern. Had the individual patrons purchased the cement and then sold to
the sales corporation, any preexisting arrangement between Portland and the
sales corporation for purchase from patrons would have tainted the transaction, and a patronage dividend would have been denied a deduction. Permeating this decision is the court's requirement of some horizontal similitude,
or common interest among the patrons, other than the profit motive, which
would distinguish them from investors in corporate enterprise.
Form of PatronageDividends. Under the current law the cooperative may
deduct amounts paid during the payment period for the taxable year as
patronage dividends, whether distributed in money, qualified written notices
of allocation, or other property. 242 A deduction is also allowed for the redemption of nonqualified written notices of allocation whether redeemed in
243
money or property.
Payment in money is the simplest form of patronage dividend. Such a
payment includes payment by check but does not include "a credit against
amounts owed by the patron to the cooperative organization, a credit against
the purchase price of a share of stock, or of membership in such organization. ' 124 4 Nor does it include a payment made in the form of a document redeemable in money by the cooperative. 245 In lieu of paying its patrons wholly
in cash a cooperative may wish to make at least part of the patronage dividends in certificates that are redeemable at some later period of time. This
239. Id. at 834.
240. Id. at 835. The court also stated: "In economic substance the taxpayer's distributions were the same as ordinary corporate dividends, and consequently they could not
be excluded from the taxpayer's gross income." Id. at 834.
241. Id. at 833-34. Of compelling importance in the court's reasoning was the fact that
the patron never actually used the product. This contravened the language of the ConE,
§1388(a)(1)(A), precluding as patronage dividends amounts paid to a patron out of
earnings other than from business done "with or for patrons."
242. CODE §1382(b) (1) (last sentence of §1382(b) permits deduction).
243. Id. §1382(b)(2). In addition, per-unit retain allocations, which relate to marketing
agreements as opposed to purchasing agreements, are also deductible under certain circumstances but will not be discussed further since they generally are not used in consumer
cooperatives. Id. §§1382 (b) (3), (4).

244. Treas. Reg. §1.1388 (1) (c) (ii) (1963).
245. Logan, supra note 225, at 1283. The author explores the possibility of stIsfying
the payment of patronage dividends with negotiablie nQtq,,
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would allow the organization the use of these funds in the interim period.
The Code permits the cooperative to do this and refers to such redeemable
2
certificates as written notices of allocation, defining them as: "6
[A]ny capital stock, revolving fund certificate, retain certificate, certificate of indebtedness, letter of advice, or other written notice, which
discloses to the recipient the stated dollar amount allocated to him by
the organization and the portion thereof, if any, which constitutes a
patronage dividend.
A written notice of allocation is qualified 247 if it may be redeemed in cash at
its stated dollar amount within a period of at least ninety days from the date
of payment 248 or if the patron consents to declare as gross income the stated
dollar amount of the qualified notice.249 The written consent required need
not take any specified form. Consent may be made by a signed invoice, sales
slip, delivery ticket, or other document that contains language informing the
member of his agreement to include the patronage dividend on his tax return.2 50 A patron may also consent to take the stated dollar amount of written notices of allocation into account by obtaining or retaining membership
in the cooperative organization. 251 Consent may also be effectuated by the
cooperative adopting a valid bylaw providing that membership in the coopera252
tive organization constitutes consent.
Qualified written notices of allocation are deductible by the coopera246.

CODE §1588(b).
247. CoDE §1388 (c). An over-all requirement is that at least 20% of the allocation must
be paid in money or by "qualified check." Id. §1588 (c)(1). The latter may be used when
consent of the patron is a requisite qualification of a written notice of allocation and
consent has not been obtained by any of the other methods prescribed by the Internal
Revenue Service. Id. §1388 (c)(4). The patron merely endorses a check on which is imprinted
a statement to the effect that the patron agrees to include the stated dollar amount as
gross income. Id. §§1588 (c) (2) (C), (c) (4). The check must be cashed before the ninetieth
day after the close of the payment period for the taxable year. Id. §1388 (c) (4).

248. Id. §1588 (c)(1)(A).
249. Id. §1588(c)(1)(B). Section 1588(c)(2) provides that such consent may be made
only by: "(A) making such consent in writing, (B) obtaining or retaining membership in
the organization after (i) such organization has adopted . . . a bylaw providing that
membership in the organization constitutes such consent, and (ii) he has received a written
notification and copy of such bylaw, or (C) endorsing and cashing a qualified check, paid
as part of the patronage dividend or payment of which such written notice of allocation is
also a part, on or before the 90th day after the close of the payment period for the taxable
year of the organization for which such patronage dividend or payment is paid."
250. Treas. Reg. §1.1588-1 (c) (5) (i) (1965). However, CODE §1588(c)(5) provides that
no consent can be irrevocable but consent is effective during the taxable year of the
cooperative in which the patronage dividend is received and for all subsequent years until
revoked.

251. CoDE §1588(c) (2) (B).
252. CODE §1588 (c)(2) (B). Treas. Reg. §1.1588-1 (c)(5)(ii) (b) (1965) offers a suggested
form of bylaw that if adopted would constitute consent. Treas. Reg. §1.1388-1 (c) (3)
(ii) (a)
(1965) provides that this consent shall take effect only after the distributee has received

a copy of the bylaw informing him of its adoption and significance. Such notice must be
given separately to each member.
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tive. 253 Ordinarily, they are includable in the gross income of the patron.254
However, when these qualified written notices of allocation are attributable
to purchases of personal, living, or family items they may be excluded from
2
the gross income of the patron. s5
Nonqualified written notices of allocation are defined as any other written notices of allocation than those that are qualified. 256 For example, if a
cooperative declares a patronage dividend but states to its members that the
dividend will be issued in the form of a note payable in one year, the note
constitutes a nonqualified written notice of allocation.257 Nonqualified writ258
ten notices of allocation are not deductible by the cooperative yhen issued.
However, the amount of money or the value of other property subsequently
paid in redemption of nonqualified written notices of allocation is deductible at the time of such redemption. 2 9 Ordinarily, cooperative patrons must
include amounts received in redemption of nonqualified written notices of
allocation in their gross income. 260 However, if the amounts are attributable
to personal, living, or family items they need not be included in the patrons'
2
gross income. 61
Computing the Amount of the PatronageDividend. In order to compute
the amount of the patronage dividend a cooperative must make an allocation
of total profits attributable to each member and available for distribution as
patronage. 262 Records of each transaction with individual patrons must be
253. CODE §1382(b) (1).

254.
255.

CODE
CODE

§1385 (a) (1).
§1385 (b)(2).

256. CODE §1388 (d).
257. In this hypothetical situation 20% of the dividend is not paid in money or by
qualified check. Id. §1388 (c). The note is not redeemable within a period extending at least
ninety days. Id. §1388 (c) (1) (A). Nor did the patron(s) consent to take into account as
gross income the stated dollar amount of the note. Id. §1388 (c) (1) (B). Therefore, the note
is a nonqualified written notice of allocation. Id. §§1388(b), (d). For a discussion of a
possible accounting problem concerning nonqualified written notices of allocation, see
Logan, supra note 225, at 1286, 1287.
258. CODE §1382(b) (1).
259. CODE §1382 (b) (2).
260. Cf. CODE §1385 (b).
261.

CODE §1385 (b) (2).

262. Logan, supra note 225, at 1277. For example, assume the cooperative sells couches
and chairs. Assume further that the profit margin on chairs is $5 and on couches is $7.
When computing patronage dividends it is assumed by the cooperative that all transactions result in equal profit. Consequently, the average profit would be $6. X buys
couches worth $200; Y buys chairs worth $50. Total profit on X and Y purchase of $250
is $20. Patronage dividends will be computed as follows:
200
250
50
50

x20= $16 to X
x 20 = $4 to Y

The patronage dividends distributed to X and Y would be deductible to the cooperative
and nontaxable to X and Y respectively.
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XXII
kept accurately in order to provide a reference at the end of 'the year for a
basis of allocation. If such records are not available through carelessness or
263
loss, an allocation may still be permitted under the Cohan rule.
The method most often used for computation of patronage dividends is
to assume that the business with patrons entitled to patronage is equally
profitable.2 6- The total net income from all business is ascertained prior to
deduction of federal taxes and after ordinary business deductions, 2 1 and if
there have been dividends on capital stock the cooperative is not allowed a
deduction for them.2 66 Capital stock dividends of a nonexempt cooperative
must be ratably charged against all net earnings, from both members and
2 17
nonmembers, before deductible patronage dividends can be computed. 6 If
otherwise qualified, the prorata portion of the remaining balance computed
in accordance with the fractional share of business done with those entitled
to patronage is considered available for patronage allocations and is deduc268
tible.
Filing the Return
One possible problem area for the cooperative is the determination of the
most advantageous time for patronage dividends and the date on which the
cooperative is obligated to file its tax return. The Commissioner has ruled
that a nonexempt cooperative is required to file an ordinary corporate return
269
on the fifteenth day of the third month after the close of the taxable year.
The Code was amended in 1962 to authorize certain nonexempt cooperatives
to have an eight and one-half month period following the close of the taxable year for filing the return. To qualify for this extension, the particular
organization must be under an obligation to pay patronage dividends in an
amount equal to fifty per cent of its net earnings from business done with
2 70
or for its patrons.
All cooperatives subject to Subchapter T, that make payments in the
263. Producers Gin, Inc. v. Commissioner, 18 CCH TAx CT. MEM. (1959). Under the
Cohan rule, Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) where records are not
accurately kept itemizing permissible deductions, a deduction may nevertheless be
permitted on a showing of other evidence by the taxpayer of his expenses. This same

rule is applicable to cooperatives for the purpose of showing that patronage dividends were
paid although the cooperative cannot itemize to whom or how much of a dividend was
paid. However, any discrepancy will bear heavily against the taxpayer since the inexactitude
of the computations are his own making.
264.

Logan, supra note 225, at 1277.

265. CoDE §§62, 162.
266. Rev. Rul. 68-228, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 385.
267. Id.
268. Logan, supra note 225, at 1278. In Farmer's Cooperative Co., 22 CCH TAx CT.
183, 185 (1963), nonpatronage income was used to pay dividends on capital stock,

MEM.

which resulted in a corresponding proportionate increase in the total amount available as
patronage income from shareholder business. The Service has continued to dissent from
this position. Rev. Rul. 68-228, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 385.
269. Rev. Rul. 59-322, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 154.
270.

CODE §6072 (d).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

31

FloridaCOOPERATIVES
Law Review, Vol.IN23,THE
Iss. 4GHETTO
[1971], Art. 3
CONSUMER
form of patronage dividends aggregating ten dollars or more to any person
during the calendar year, are also required to submit an information return
giving the aggregate amount of such payments and the name and address of
each person to whom paid.271 However, consumer cooperatives engaged primarily in distributing items of a type generally for personal, living, or family
use are exempted from filling the reports.2 7 2 In order for a cooperative to
qualify for this exemption from reporting, eighty-five per cent of its gross
receipts for the preceding taxable year, or eighty-five per cent of its aggregate gross receipts for the preceding three taxable years, must have been derived from the sale at retail of goods or services of a type that is generally for
273
personal, living, or family use.
Summary. The cooperative has the ability to "price-out 274 and thereby
avoid much, if not all, of any tax that might be imposed at the cooperative
level. The purpose of Subchapter T is to assure that a tax is levied on either
the cooperative or patron.27 5 Congress has chosen not to enforce this policy,
however, when the patron receives a dividend from transactions involving
personal, family, and living expense items. 276 If close attention is given to
the federal tax laws applicable to cooperatives it may be possible to avoid
tax at the cooperative or consumer level and insure a maximum potential for
growth and development of the consumer cooperative.
CONCLUSION

The cooperative form of distribution with its emphasis on economic power through collective, democratic effort can uniquely provide the urban

poor with quality goods at reduced prices. When compared with independent, ghetto-based retail businesses, cooperatives provide three sources for additional consumer savings: elimination of net profits, reduction of operating
costs, and reduction or elimination of the federal income tax.
From the standpoint of its ability to survive the adverse economic conditions of the ghetto, the consumer cooperative is also at a distinct advantage
over the traditional retail business. Ghetto consumers are more likely to pa-

271. CODE §6044 (a) (1).
272. CODE §6044(c). A cooperative is not exempt from the reporting requirements
merely because it is an organization of a type that is described as entitled to the exemption.

Treas. Reg. §1.6044-4 (a) (1).
273. Treas. Reg. §1.6044-4(a)(2). The period of the exemption extends until the
first taxable year in which gross receipts for permissible items fall below 70%. Treas. Reg.
§1.6044-4 (a) (3).
274. R. PATrsoN, THE TAX EXEMPTION OF COOPERATIVES (1961). Pricing-out is the
ability of a cooperative to pay patronage dividends to member patrons so that the cooperative does not retain any income on which to be taxed.
275. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 78-79 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 111-12 (1962).
276. Id.
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